IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS STATE OF MISSOURI The Honorable Timothy J. Boyer

JOHN L. DURNELL,)
)
Plaintiff,)
VS.)Cause No. 1922-CC00221
)
MONSANTO COMPANY,)
)
Defendant.)

TRIAL TRANSCRIPT

Thursday, October 19, 2023

Volume 12A

designer and manufacturer would use under the same or similar circumstances.

Instruction No. 15: You must not award plaintiff John Durnell an additional amount as punitive damages under Instruction No. 14 unless you believe that, first, defendant Monsanto failed to design Roundup to be reasonably safe or adequately warn of the risk of harm that Roundup is carcinogenic and, second, defendant Monsanto knew or had information from which defendant Monsanto, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known than such conduct created a high degree of probability of injury and, third, defendant Monsanto thereby showed complete indifference to or a conscious disregard for the safety of others.

The phrase "ordinary care" means that degree of care that an ordinarily careful product designer and manufacturer would use under the same or similar circumstances.

PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

THE COURT: Mr. Frazer, closing argument on behalf of Mr. John Durnell.

MR. FRAZER: Your Honor, I understand we have an hour and 45 minutes each?

THE COURT: That's correct.

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MR. FRAZER: I just wanted to give the jury a warning. And I split my argument up. Some of my argument will come now and some will come after Mr. Brown's.

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. FRAZER: Okay.

Good morning. Good morning.

This is the last time I'm probably going to get to say good morning to you unless I see you on the street someday. And the first thing I want to say is I want to thank every one of you for your service. It takes a lot to come here every day and serve as a juror.

I've tried so many cases in my lifetime, I've been doing this for almost 39 years, and I'm always encouraged by what I see in a jury, that you all came here, you didn't know each other, you listened intently through the entire proof. And some of it was hard. No question. And you took notes.

And then we kind of noticed as the trial went on, you actually became friends with each other.

It's a beautiful thing to see in our civil justice system, and I just want to thank you so much on behalf of my client, John Durnell. He wants to thank you. He can't say that. I'm saying it for

him.

2.1

You remember in my opening I talked about symbols of justice. The courtroom has the scales of justice. I just heard the judge tell you what the burden of proof is in this case. It's more likely than not.

So in looking back at that scale over the door back there that you guys never get to go out of, the scales just have to tip in our favor.

Now, do I believe they're just tipping by a feather or a piece of paper or a cup of coffee?

No. I think they're tipping if you put an anchor on one side. That's what I think the proof has been in this case. I think that's what you're going to find.

As the judge just told you -- and he gave you the instructions of law. I told you in my opening the judge is the judge of the law. You've seen him judge the law the whole time. Every time a lawyer objects, he makes a ruling on it. And he just took the law of the State of Missouri and instructed you on what the law is.

But he also just told you that you are the exclusive finders of fact in this case. Not me. Not Monsanto. Not the defense lawyers. Not

anybody outside this jury box. It's all up to v'all.

2.1

And I told you in my opening John Durnell was willing to put his life into your hands, and he still is in that same position.

So what else? The beads of justice. We talked about that. The beads around this courtroom call for bountiful justice. We'll get to that in a little while.

There are symbols of justice when you walk into this building. You've seen them all as you walk in every day. You seen them up there carved. Give justice. No matter what happens, no matter in the heavens fall one of the sayings say, you are to give justice. Treat brothers like the same.

And John Durnell wants you to do that. He wants you to treat Monsanto just as you would treat him. That's a fundamental rule of fairness in our civil justice system.

So I told you in my opening that this case is about choice and freedom. Choice and freedom.

John Durnell. Monsanto. John Durnell is entitled to an informed choice. John Durnell is entitled to freedom to live. You heard that Monsanto made a choice.

You heard from Kirk Azevedo by video. Do you remember that? That was about three weeks ago. He said he came and he met with the -- Brett Begemann who said the choice here is all about making money. They put profits over people. That's what's going on here. Profits over people.

And the profits are massive. We'll look at stipulation. You had it read in to you earlier. But they're massive.

And witnesses like Donna Farmer and Jim Guard got stock options whenever the company was sold to Bayer. Even their own witnesses are motivated by profits, their own scientists. So keep that in mind.

The judge instructed you on negligence, on product defect, on cause or contributed to cause. Remember I told you in my opening we didn't have to prove to you that the sole cause, the only cause the one and only cause of John Durnell's non-Hodgkin's lymphoma was his exposure to Roundup, the formulated product. That's not our legal burden. It can be a cause or contribute to cause.

The judge just instructed you on it.

Now, you heard Dr. Spaeth say it was a substantial cause, a significant cause. Dr. Spaeth

being the only witness who came in this courtroom whose job it is every day in New York City to diagnose what somebody's cause of cancer or a disease is. That's his job. Nobody else did that. Dr. Matasar, he's an oncologist. He treated, he treated people. Dr. Tomasetti, he's a math guy. Dr. Tarone, I don't know what he was other than an angry man. You saw him on the video. Y'all be the judge of that.

2.1

But Dr. Spaeth is the only one who came into this courtroom and said significantly and substantially caused or contributed to John Durnell's non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. That's what he does. He does that for the 9/11 commission. He does that for the New York workers' compensation board. That's what he does.

So cause or contributed to. Always think of Dr. Spaeth.

More likely than not. We talked about that.

The scale of justice. You can have doubt. You can even have reasonable doubt, because this is not a criminal case. That's our system. That's what the judge just instructed you on. It's more likely than not. It's not beyond all reasonable doubt in a criminal case.

2.1

You can see the proof in this case is -- over a 50-year period of a product being on a market is a gargantuan task.

More likely than not.

John Durnell, he's -- back to this, he's -- he and Richard have been together for 48 years.

They've been married nine years, because they had to wait until it was almost legal for them to get married in Missouri. They got sued by the attorney general. They won that lawsuit and they're legally married in the State of Missouri.

You just heard the judge instruct you. You're not supposed to hold anything against them because they're a gay couple. You would violate your oath as jurors, you would violate the law that the judge has given you if you do such a thing. I don't think you will, but I have to say that because I have to zealously represent this man.

You all heard him from the witness stand. You heard Richard Eaton from the witness stand. You be the judge of that.

Is this thing working?

You saw this earlier in the case, the area where John Durnell sprayed. The whole Soulard neighborhood, every park, every corner, every crack

on every sidewalk, driveway, and every playground on those parks. That's where he sprayed Roundup for a very long period of time. There's been absolutely no contradiction in this case that John Durnell sprayed Roundup over a very long period of time.

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He told you, he testified he went to Ace
Hardware all the time to buy Roundup. He actually
still had a few Roundup bottles in here that
Richard Eaton said they did not use for decoration.

Y'all remember that. He used them. They made a big deal about Richard Eaton not ever seeing him spray Roundup, which seemed kind of odd to me, but they made a big deal out of that. Because look at the bottles. They're going to come up and make a big deal out of how old these bottles are. But remember when he said he quit spraying.

He sprayed all over the neighborhood, sprayed all over Soulard, and he did it because he was a volunteer. There are very few people these days that volunteer as much as the time as this man has volunteered to that neighborhood with the singular purpose of improving the life of everybody that came to live there.

Not selfishly. Not just focused on himself.

He was focused on the beautification of the whole neighborhood. So was his husband Richard Eaton.

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Talk a little bit what you're already heard.

I'll try to get through this quickly.

We know now, you know, as I told you in my opening, you're a jury, you've seen documents, you've heard testimony that no other jury has ever heard about Roundup.

And what the evidence shows is that Monsanto did not even have a clear scientific basis to expose people to Roundup and concealed it from the public since 1974. That's a long time ago.

And you remember Donna Farmer testifying about a laboratory called IBT. Do you remember that?

She talked about that. She knew a little bit about it, didn't know all about it, but she talked about it.

And you learned that in -- in the 1980s, the IBT study that allowed Roundup to go on the market, the mouse study for carcinogenicity was ruled out by the EPA because of IBT's laboratory.

You've heard a lot of evidence in this case that John Durnell has suffered through a cancer, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, as a cause or contributing cause of Monsanto's conduct. That's pretty clear.

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Roundup exposure caused or contributed to cause John Durnell's non-Hodgkin's lymphoma cancer.

Now, everybody believes that except for Dr. Tomasetti, the mathematician, the guy who, if you'd try to take him on on a math equation, he would take your lunch money from you, every time. right.

He's got some math equation that he says says less than 5 percent of people get non-Hodgkin's lymphoma due to anything other than random replication errors and bad luck. That was his testimony. That was his testimony.

You heard Dr. Matasar say that Dr. Tomasetti's article in 2015, the two articles in 2015 and 2017 who Dr. Tomasetti on direct testified were probably the greatest thing since Einstein's theory of relatively, that Dr. Matasar didn't even know about him until he got contacted by lawyers for Monsanto when he negotiated his deal.

Do you remember how hard it was for me to even get him to tell me what the word "negotiate" was yet he had it on his letter that he signed, the retention letter?

And he was a pretty good negotiator. Remember the retention letter? It said \$3,000 for a day.

And he told you from the witness stand he got \$5,000. Pretty good negotiator.

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Monsanto's glyphosate team. We've talked about them in opening. The CEO, Mr. Hugh Grant. Donna Farmer's ultimate boss, Dr. Koch, Dr. Heydens, Brett Begemann, John Aquavella, David Saltmiras, Dr. Martins, Dr. Goldstein, and two people that you actually heard from, Jim Guard and Donna Farmer.

You saw a lot of emails from those other people, but you didn't see them come into the courtroom.

In fact, John Durnell is the one that brought
Donna Farmer in here to testify, not Monsanto. We
brought her in here. John Durnell is the one that
brought Jim Guard and put him on the witness stand.
Not Monsanto. Monsanto didn't bring a single
company witness. They didn't bring in the CEO. He
didn't have time to show up. This guy, Dr. Koch,
Dr. Heydens, Mr. Begemann, Dr. Acquavella,
Dr. Saltmiras, Dr. Martins, Dr. Goldstein, none of
them. And none of the other names you saw on all
those emails.

You can probably guess why they didn't.

Because they don't want us asking any questions of

them.

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We can't call everybody. We can't bring every witness in here because this trial would go on for six years. We try to be respectful of your time, even though I know I went on a lot some times. I apologize for that. I know my voice dropped and the witness couldn't hear me or I turned my back to them. I apologized for that.

I know that I got going sometimes and the judge had to stop me. I apologize for that. The key thing I want you to know, don't hold that against John Durnell. Please. Please don't hold anything that you thought I did wrong or messed up or didn't talk loud enough, don't hold that against John Durnell. Hold it against me. Hold it against me.

But so we bring these two people in. You know what their testimony was, and we'll talk about a little bit more about it later, but this is who they are.

And you remember, Mr. Azevedo was talking about that guy right there, Brett Begemann who was the guy that said, hey, we're all about making money. That guy became the CEO and president of the company.

Don't forget this document. Donna Farmer's own words: "For example, you cannot say that Roundup is not a carcinogen. We have not done the necessary studies."

She didn't take that back. She said she had other stuff to say about it, but she never did.

That's what Monsanto says. Do you see why they have to go get a mathematician in Los Angeles and an oncologist all the way in New York instead somebody here from Wash U. to testify about this? Because they cannot bring people in the courtroom when they have a document, internal document by their own scientist saying, "For example, you cannot say that Roundup is not a carcinogen. We haven't done the necessary studies."

This is not a document we created. This is an internal secret email that nobody has -- at the EPA's ever seen. Nobody in New Zealand has seen it. Nobody in Australia has seen it. Nobody in Canada has seen it at the regulatory authorities.

That's what she said.

And do you remember what Dr. Tomasetti said, the last a couple of questions I asked him? I said, "Does a negative times a negative equal a positive in math?"

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Do you remember what he said? He said yes. Two negatives make a positive.

Here's what you have. You've got Donna Farmer saying you cannot say that Roundup is not a carcinogen. If you take Dr. Tomasetti's math formula and you apply it to that statement, it would read, "For example, you can say that Roundup is a carcinogen."

Maybe that's a stretch, I don't know, but this is how they talk. This is her statement. She affirmed it under oath and to this day, that is what the company says. They didn't bring anybody else in here to say, "We don't say that anymore."

You saw other documents about testing. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2582, a 2010 document with regards to carcinogenicity of our formulations, remember that. This is not an optical illusion. "We don't have such testing on them directly."

The company that makes this, that's 2010, it's been on the mark since 1975. They're making the statement in 2010.

We don't have -- and they can't show you any test they've done since 2010 to correct this either. They had an opportunity with Donna Farmer on the stand, and they didn't do it.

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And then what do we read about in their own company code of business conduct? Integrity. It's the foundation for all that we do. It includes honesty, decency, consistency, and courage.

But the most interesting thing is, you know, they come in this courtroom and say, hey, look the EPA did everything, and they -- they're the -- they're trying to tell you that's the decision you need to make. Just follow the EPA. Well, what do they say in their own code of conduct? It says:

"We, we comply with all relevant international and national and local laws and regulations. We conduct rigorous assessments to establish the safety of our products in addition by meeting or exceeding all regulatory requirements. We assure our customers, growers and consumers that we've established the safety of all our products and when required have satisfied rigorous reviews by appropriate regulatory authorities to assure the freedom to use our products."

And Monsanto's own -- maybe they made this up.

Maybe they're just joking. Internally, they're
saying we exceed whatever the regulations are. We
don't try to just meet them. We exceed them.

That's their code of conduct.

For years Monsanto sold Roundup without a valid cancer study. We talked about IBT.

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Then they came along in 1983. We've said it a bunch of times, the Knezevich and Hogan study. I even talked about it with Dr. Matasar. Do you remember that? It showed a 640 percent increase in kidney tumors in mice.

Now, this is a Monsanto study. This is not a free study like Donna Farmer talked about. Do you remember she talked about free studies, stuff we don't pay for, we just get them, read them, follow them?

This is a Monsanto study. They paid for it.

They commissioned it. They got it. And they turn it into the EPA and the EPA said, wait. Whoa, whoa, whoa. Not so fast. We're seeing a 640 percent greater than normal or random increase in kidney tumors in mice.

I asked Dr. Matasar yesterday, and I felt sympathy for him. I represent cancer victims -- in almost everything I do I'm representing cancer victims. And I asked him. I had sympathy for him. I hope I showed that. I asked him, I said, "You had a kidney tumor. Do you know about this study?"

"No."

"You sprayed Roundup as a child?"
"Yes."

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I don't know if it's related, but that's what Monsanto knew back in 1983. Not 5 percent. Not less than 5 percent. 640 percent greater.

And, in fact, when the EPA got the study, what did they do? They declared glyphosate in 1985, the EPA, the Environmental Protection Agency of the United States of America declared glyphosate a Class C carcinogen.

That's important in two respects because you heard Dr. Tomasetti and Dr. Matasar saying the EPA never classified glyphosate as a carcinogen. Well, here it is. This is a government document. I didn't make this thing up. A Class C carcinogen.

It's also important to know, ladies and gentlemen, what most every regulatory authority they put on the board, what did they -- what were they regulating? There's not a single regulatory authority that's regulating formulated Roundup. They're regulating glyphosate.

That Agricultural Health Study that they like to parade around looked at glyphosate-based herbicides. It didn't even account for other company formulations. It didn't look at formulated

Roundup.

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And the EPA itself, their decision's on glyphosate. It's not on the other things that we see in Roundup, which we'll cover in just a minute.

There it is, Category C oncogen. That's a carcinogen.

What did -- what was Monsanto's response?

Kind of like what they've done with Dr. Tomasetti.

Okay. Hey, the only way we can get out of this now is to do some gymnastics and find somebody in the United States who will say that the tumor, that there was a tumor in the control group of those mice. Because if we can put a tumor in the control group, on one of those, now we can say it's not a 640 percent increase.

So they go around and start searching for a scientist. What can we do to get this thing off of Group C.

They find this guy named Dr. Kuschner. This is Plaintiff's Exhibit 318, April 1985. And before Dr. Kuschner even gets the tissue slides so he can find this tumor in the control group, Monsanto predicts he's going to go ahead and do that. They already knew what was in the box. They were on Let's Make a Deal. They don't ever not know what's

going to be in that box when they pick a box, when they pick a scientist. You've all seen that time and time again.

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Kuschner didn't even get the tissue slides until eleven days after Monsanto predicted he was going to help us.

Back in the old days you have to sign for a FedEx receipt, so we know the date that Dr.

Kuschner got the slides. He signed for them on 4/14/85. The date of that memo before was April 3, 1985.

Yeah, Dr. Kuschner did it. He confirmed the presence of a tumor in the -- in the control group mice. They took that back to the EPA, and the EPA said: We don't see it.

And the EPA asked them to make another study of it and they never did. Monsanto to this day has never done another chronic toxicity or carcinogenicity mouse study on glyphosate.

And we know for a fact it's never done one, ever with anybody, Knezevich and Hogan or IBT, on formulated Roundup, the product they sold to John Durnell and other people.

In fact, Donna Farmer writes in August of 1999. That's a long time ago too. That's over 24

years ago, I think. I had hair back then.

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Donna Farmer writes, "I will not support doing any studies on glyphosate formulations or other surfactant ingredients at this time."

So the lead toxicologist, the woman that knows more about glyphosate inside the company and more about Roundup inside the company that anybody else, because if somebody else does, they didn't bring them here, we brought her, she's saying let's don't any studies on the formulated product. You have to ask yourself, well, why not? Why wouldn't they?

I mean, most products we buy, they get tested, the whole product. You don't buy a car and they just tested the seat belt without it being in the car, for instance.

And her topic in this email was Roundup, not glyphosate, mutagenicity. So here you have

Monsanto in their own internal documents talking about Roundup mutagenicity, and they bring a mathematician here from Los Angeles at \$900 an hour to tell you there's nothing mutagenic about Roundup. Now, you can see why they don't bring their own scientists in here.

We've seen that study after study after study of glyphosate, formulated Roundup caused DNA

damage. To human beings. They cause oxidative damage. You heard even Dr. Tomasetti and Matasar admit that it causes oxidative stress in your cellular system that can lead to cancer mutations. They admitted that on cross-examination.

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And if you look at the independent free studies which, by the way, are the ones that IARC looked at. They sure the heck didn't look at any internal Monsanto documents. They probably would have found it a Class 1 carcinogen had they done that, not a 2A.

But they viewed these new studies coming out as the tip of the iceberg. They started coming out in 1999. Donna Farmer writes it's just the tip of the iceberg. We heard from Hardell. We know what the tip of an iceberg is. Most of the iceberg underground. Underwater. More of it is coming. That's what an iceberg is.

So what did they do? Gosh, we got all these studies coming out, showing glyphosate is causing DNA damage, oxidative stress, cellular damage.

What are we going to do about it? Well, let's hire this geneticist named Dr. Parry. Dr. Parry is the first guy they hired and the last guy they hired where they didn't know what was in the box. He was

one of the world's top geneticist.

2.1

One of your questions is why would Monsanto hire a geneticist instead of a mathematician? They wanted to hire the top guy. Dr. Parry. He's over in England. Went all the way over to England to get this guy. And he gave advice to Monsanto, and they never followed it.

Leading up to that, Donna Farmer writes, "If Larry" -- that's Larry Kier. That's the good Dr. Kier. Do you remember me asking about that? "He's the only one that can pull us out of this genotox hole."

Genotoxicity hole. I didn't use that term. That's a term they're using.

Do you remember they -- Dr. Tomasetti said he hadn't seen a single internal Monsanto document, and so did Dr. Matasar. Hadn't seen a single one.

Dr. Parry said they gave him these four studies, you heard that testimony from Dr. Farmer. They gave him four to test him to see if he would agree with Monsanto. And he did read them, and he said he concluded that the overall data provided by the four publications provide evidence to support a model that glyphosate is capable of producing genotoxicity both in vivo, in lives, and in vitro,

in cells, by a mechanism based upon the production of oxidative damage.

2.1

That's what Dr. Parry told him back in 1999.

Then he suggested, you know what you really ought to do, you need to assess the formulated product, cause they're acting -- they might be acting synergistically to increase the potential genotoxicity of glyphosate. Such studies could be designed to investigate a panel of mixtures, leaving out one component of the mix for each individual experiment.

So what he's saying there is let's take formulated Roundup and do a test on it. Then let's don't have 1,4-dioxane in it this time and see if there's any difference. Let's put 1,4-dioxane back in and this time let's take out formaldehyde. Next time take out arsenic. Next time take out NNG.

Next time take out whatever we can find in that bottle and then we can see what's really causing that effect on it.

Did Monsanto do what Dr. Parry told them to do back in 1999? Of course not. Because Dr. Farmer had already said we can't to that. I won't support that.

What did they do then? Well, he's given his

2.1

opinion. The cat's out of the bag. What do we do now? Let's see if we can see things our way.

Let's try one more time with Dr. Parry. Because he is the top geneticist in the whole wide world. And if we can get him to say something good for us, then all the studies coming out, we don't have to worry about them anymore.

So he did. He came back with a second report.

And this one was really bad for Monsanto.

Remember, they're paying this guy. Not a free study. It's a cost study.

Dr. Parry stays firm. He concludes glyphosate is carcinogenic, that it causes mutations, damages and disruptions of chromosomes in human DNA.

Nobody outside of Monsanto has seen this document. Not Dr. Parry -- not Dr. Tomasetti, not Dr. Matasar. Donna Farmer had. Remember? She testified about it.

He pleaded with Monsanto: "If the genotoxic activity of glyphosate and its formulations is confirmed, it would be advisable to determine whether there are exposed individuals and groups within the human population. If such individuals can be identified, then, the extent of exposure should be determined and their lymphocytes analyzed

for the presence of chromosome aberrations."

2.1

That's what he told them. Dr. Tomasetti's never seen this because this doesn't work into his math equations. Truth, facts, Monsanto's own internal documents don't fit into his math equations.

What did they do? They shut him down. He's out of here. Don't ever do that again. Don't ever get an expert without knowing what he's going to say.

EPA's never seen his reports. The public has never seen Dr. Parry's reports. And sadly to say, neither has Dr. Tomasetti.

So they got to do something. They decide.

Okay. Let's hire some people to write a paper.

That's a good idea.

And, again, we don't use this word called "ghostwriting." Monsanto used it in their documents. Usually I get called down by a Court if I use something like ghostwriting if I can't find it in a document. Even though I can show, they gave them this manuscript and it changed right here. Monsanto admits to it.

It's right here. Dr. Heydens, Dr. Farmer, Dr. Koch, Dr. Saltmiras: Manuscript to be

initiated by Monsanto as ghostwriters. It was noted this would be more powerful if authored by non Monsanto scientists, e.g., Kirkland, Kier, Williams.

2.1

What's that last name? Greim. Do you remember Dr. Tarone's entire testimony was based upon an article made by Dr. Greim? That's what he talked about for an hour, a mouse study that Dr. Greim wrote about.

Here's the good Dr. Greim with the good Dr.

Kier. They're on team Monsanto. This is what

Donna Farmer got awards for is finding these

scientists to say that they wrote those and let

Monsanto initiate them as ghostwriters. She got an award from company for doing that.

I can't make this up. The internal document from John Acquavella, the only epidemiologist ever hired by Monsanto, he said, hey, these articles, one more study could just add fuel to the fire.

So what did they do? Do you remember? They had -- they had Donna, they had -- they tried to contact some authors and push them into certain positions, and Donna Farmer wrote back being very happy about what they accomplished, saying they don't know what's in the small print, but the fact

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that the McDuffie article doesn't mention glyphosate in the abstract, that's a win for us.

Because if you're searching abstracts as a medical researcher and you're looking for the word "glyphosate" and you're just looking at abstracts because that's a quicker way to find stuff, you don't even find this article. So they're celebrating. They accomplished something.

Eriksson came out with a study, 202 percent increased risk of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. percent increased risk if you use it more than ten days.

Schinasi and Leon, 100 percent increased risk of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. Donna Farmer's response was not we need to tell people that there's a chance they might get something called non-Hodgkin's lymphoma if they use our product, we need to tell people that, because we got folks like John Durnell out there using it.

That wasn't her response. Her response was, how do we combat this? We got to go to combat.

Again, I'm not saying this. But if fits with what you heard from Dr. Tarone by video. He said his fight -- he said fight about 20 times. He said his fight was with IARC. That what he said.

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Donna Farmer's saying we got to combat it. Let's go find some fighters like Robert Tarone.

Then Monsanto finds out that the International Agency for the Research on Cancer is going to convene a meeting to analyze all the independent published scientific studies on glyphosate.

I'm not aware of a single attack by Monsanto on IARC, if I were I would bring it to you that happened before glyphosate. And Monsanto makes a lot of chemicals. Never heard of them attack one time.

You heard what Dr. Tomasetti said. He said IARC was the gold standard. Because it is. That's why they call it the International Agency for the Research on Cancer. The World Health Organization funded by the United States government.

Y'all saw who was on that. Do you remember who was on that committee? Two people from the United States Environmental Protection Agency. They had people from the U.S. government. Aaron Blair was with the National Institutes of Health. He was the chair. They had somebody from the European Chemicals Agency, which they like to parade out in front of you, who was on the panel.

They had a guy who was a computational

toxicologist who not only could do math but he was also a toxicologist, unlike Dr. Tomasetti.

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They had that kind of a quality panel. And even these people on the EPA with the U.S. government all voted unanimously that glyphosate was a probable human carcinogen. Not a possible one. Not a more likely than not one. A probable human carcinogen.

And I would argue to you, ladies and gentlemen, if they'd seen the documents you'd seen, they would have said it was a known human carcinogen, which is the Category 1. Category 2A.

Do you remember seeing the documents where they said, hey, maybe we get this in 2B? That's when they were planning the orchestration of outcry over. Do you remember that? Maybe get it to 2B. It ended up 2A, a probable human carcinogen.

Three pillars. Three pillars of proof.

Epidemiology for carcinogenicity. Except if you're

Dr. Tomasetti. Every scientist agrees

epidemiology, you look at the epidemiology, you

look at the animal studies, number two, and you

look at the cell and mechanistic studies number

three.

Every scientist in the world calls that the

three pillars of determining whether or not a substance that's suspected of causing cancer actually causes cancer. That's what IARC does. They look at -- they don't look at every substance in the world. They don't look at, you know, whether holding this clicker in my hand causes me cancer.

2.1

They look at substances that there's some evidence already out in the literature or in the field, i.e., people working in a particular industry like coal miners and black lung, and saying is that exposure carcinogenic. Let's look at all the literature. Let's make a decision and let's decide that.

And then here with glyphosate, remember they didn't look at formulated Roundup. They said glyphosate is a probable human carcinogen.

Monsanto said, Dr. Farmer's copied on this,

IARC evaluation of glyphosate, "While we have

vulnerability in the area of epidemiology, we also

have potential vulnerabilities in other areas that

IARC will consider, namely exposure, genotox, and

mode of action." That's your cellular mechanistic

pillar.

So, you know, again, I'm not saying that they

had vulnerabilities. They're saying that they had vulnerabilities. They knew this going into IARC.

2.1

So what did they do? They said, Let's get a plan. Let's orchestrate outcry. And that's what they've done ever since. It's what they did in the courtroom for three weeks. They orchestrated outcry. Like a conductor: Dr. Tomasetti.

They were orchestrating outcry. They started this back before IARC even met. They knew, they knew once the world looked at glyphosate, once the top scientists in the world looked at glyphosate, they were in trouble. They knew that. That's why they set this whole big committee up that Donna Farmer was on.

And their goal was to actively tell our story, build the right relationship, y'all know what that means, let nothing go, nothing, and discomfort our opposition.

Now, discomforting an opposition is anything from saying something to them bad or beating them over the head with something. I don't think they beat anybody over the head, but they put some discomfort on IARC. They orchestrated outcry.

They started it before IARC met, and they continued it after they met.

But you know what's really weird is Monsanto had its own representative there, not as like a spectator, not up in the stands at Busch Stadium. He wasn't on the last row. He was right there.

Now, he didn't vote, but you saw his emails. Do you remember that? His little weekly report, daily report for the time he was over there at the IARC, saying all the little progress he's been able to make.

He was like -- he was saying, hey, everything here, I'm following it for you. I'm making sure it gets pushed in the right direction, et cetera, et cetera. He was over there for Monsanto.

Despite his efforts, IARC unanimously decided to list glyphosate as a Class 2A carcinogen, a probable human carcinogen. That's International Agency for the Research on Cancer. The gold standard. We talked about that.

After IARC, what happened? Additional and -- additional independent studies started coming out. Do you remember we looked at the 96 scientists letter where 96 scientists wrote in and said we agree with IARC's conclusion, 96 of the top scientists in the world?

More studies kept coming out. More studies

kept showing that glyphosate is not only a probable human carcinogen but scientists started looking at formulated Roundup as even more toxic.

2.1

From 2018 to 2023, and we looked at some 2023 studies, if y'all remember, 40 consistent independent scientific studies do not dispute IARC's determination.

What's in your bottle? You know we -- we made a lot of efforts to find out what's in a bottle of Roundup because, if you look at it -- by the way, you can see Mr. Durnell, John used extended control Roundup, he used Roundup Super Concentrate. Do you see that? It's got more glyphosate in it, 50.2 percent glyphosate. Other ingredients, 49.8 percent, the other ingredients.

He used this concentrate plus. It had 18 percent glyphosate in it, 81.27 percent other ingredients. Nonlisted by the way. You can take these back and look at them if you want to when you're deliberating.

And then he used some Roundup Ready-to-Use, which is already -- it's all premixed, ready to go. You just pull the wand out and spray it. He demonstrated that to you.

But we had to dig and dig to find out

what was in the bottle of Roundup. You know, we suspected that there's got to be something more to other ingredients. Because it's got a smell to it. It feels a little funny. I washed my hands vigorously after that, but I wanted to learn about the product. There's got to be something else in here besides just water and glyphosate.

2.1

And so what do we find out? We found a lot of stuff in there. In Monsanto's own documents. We couldn't afford to take this stuff to a lab and say, hey, tell us everything that's in there. We had to get Monsanto's own internal documents and figure out what's in the bottle.

And shouldn't consumers know what's in something they're using every day? We go to the grocery store and sometimes we look on the label and we see a bunch of chemical names and we decide, hey, I don't think I want that today.

Or we see something else we might want to use, maybe it's if you're an auto mechanic, you work on cars, you might pick one particular product over another because one's got a warning on it and the other one doesn't, and you see things in each product like formaldehyde.

So we found out formaldehyde was in Roundup.

Dr. DeGrandchamp told you it's a carcinogen. We found out that this chemical called 1,4-dioxane, I didn't know that such a chemical existed, was in a bottle of Roundup. Dr. DeGrandchamp said known carcinogen.

2.1

We found nitrosamines were in a bottle of Roundup, NNG. Dr. DeGrandchamp says that's a carcinogen. We found that arsenic was in a bottle of Roundup. Dr. DeGrandchamp and probably everybody in this courtroom knows that arsenic is a carcinogen. We definitely know it's a poison. It's used to kill people.

Now, you heard Dr. Farmer by the way. She just kind of waved it off on formaldehyde. You know, there's some things our body produces naturally, formaldehyde. That's what they want you to think when they put Barbasol shaving cream up here, Dawn detergent, chocolate.

It's almost, it's funny what they put up to try to make you think, oh, they're right. A dog should not eat chocolate, so there shouldn't be any animal studies. No scientist in the world believes that. No scientist says you shouldn't do animal studies because they're not like humans.

Every company in the world would throw a party

if you didn't have to do animal studies to try to figure out if one of their products caused cancer or not. That's a better word to use.

2.1

We found out that it's got surfactants in it.

Three carcinogens, ethylene oxide, POEA, and, of course, we know that glyphosate has been determined by IARC and other scientists to be a probable human carcinogen. That's what's in the bottle. Why don't they just put it on the label? That would so easy for them to do.

They're going to try to say, hey, well, the EPA didn't require us to do. Their own code of conduct says we go above and beyond regulations.

And don't think the time to go above and beyond all regulations is when you know you've got carcinogens in your bottle and you don't list them on your label? That's the time to do it.

No human in his right mind is going to go into a Lowe's or a Home Depot or a Walmart or an Ace Hardware store and pick a weed killer when one says it's got that stuff in it and the other one doesn't. That's why they don't do it. People know what formaldehyde is. It's used to embalm people. You know it's not good for you.

Do you remember they said they're -- you know,

this is, this is not -- this is not Dr.

DeGrandchamp. This is an internal Monsanto

document, P263. We've got a low-level presence of

formaldehyde, carcinogen by inhalation in Roundup.

Notice he used Roundup.

2.1

We've got a low-level presence of NNG in Roundup. Many N-nitro compounds are carcinogenic. We've got toxic studies for glyphosate at the lab. He mentions IBT. Look at that. The FDA and EPA got to generate fraudulent data back in the '70s.

I didn't say that. Dr. Heydens, Donna

Farmer's boss, the top toxicologist in the company
at the time said IBT did stuff for us that the FDA,
the Food and Drug Administration and the EPA, the
Environmental Protection Agency of the United
States of America, found to generate fraudulent
data.

So what were they doing about 1,4-dioxane? We saw some of those documents. We saw documents where it was as a high as 350 parts per million when they had internal company spec of one part per million. One and 350 is a big difference. It's not trace at 350. I would argue it's not trace at one. It's just the limit they put in there.

They wanted to raise the limit. Look, we got

to raise the limit to at least 10 parts per million. That was how they were reacting.

2.1

Here's a document in evidence to show you what they -- how they made Roundup warnings. How many of us have been at Walmart and we hear something over the PA system that says, "Spill on Aisle 11"? Every one of us have heard that before. That is a warning. And if you're on Aisle 11, it's telling you watch where you're going to walk. There's a risk and a hazard and if you're on Aisle 10 and you get to Aisle 11, by the time you go to Aisle 11, they usually have some orange cones or something around it so you can't walk in it even if you didn't hear the warning. That's what a good warning is.

Walmart gives a better warning to people when they have a spill of milk in the store than Monsanto's ever given to a Roundup lawn and garden buyer. You get a better warning from Walmart on a spill on the floor.

And you know what warnings boil down to is whose choice is it. Should it be Monsanto's choice about what to tell a consumer so they can make a decision, an intelligent decision, or should it be the consumer's choice?

Ladies and gentlemen, I argue to you, I would argue to you that most of the companies in America believe it should be the consumer's choice. Most companies in America, will say, you know, we want to let our customers know everything we know about a product. Most companies in America will say we want every customer to know what's in that product. Most companies in America, if they had any cancer information at all, would share it with the public.

But what did Monsanto do? Minimize label restrictions, optimize freedom to operate.

Again, it's a Monsanto document. Remember, I tried to emphasize to you, very inartfully, it's been a long time since I played basketball, but freedom to operate is basically pivoting with your elbows out, trying to get everybody away from you. Pick up the ball, keep up your dribble, keep it away from everybody.

That's what freedom to operate is. And they're optimizing freedom to operate and minimizing label restrictions. That's their corporate mentality. 100 percent different, a 180-turn from what they say in their own code of conduct.

They give their own employees who work around

glyphosate a warning about carcinogenicity and glyphosate right here. It's P1799. They say it's not carcinogenic in rats or mice. Y'all know that's not really true, don't you? They knew it wasn't true.

But let's see what else they wrote. Listed as Category 2A by the International Agency for Research on Cancer, IARC, but our expert opinion is that classification as a carcinogen is not warranted.

At least they told their own employees this. As incomplete and inaccurate as that is, at least they got it. Consumers like John Durnell at the Ace Hardware store never got a warning like that.

Now, they're going to come and say, oh, OSHA makes us do this. We have to do this because of regulatory. Please go above and beyond regulations for once and follow your own code of conduct, your own standard you set for yourself when it comes to health and safety issues of somebody that's going to get cancer.

THE COURT: One hour, Mr. Frazer.

MR. FRAZER: Thank you, your Honor.

At their own plant in Luling, Louisiana, where they make glyphosate, they tell their workers to

wear gloves. They tell their workers to wear PPE.

They tell their workers don't smoke, drink, or eat
in the presence of glyphosate.

2.1

Wear a white Tyvek -- here's that they tell them: Wear a white Tyvek jacket, chemical gloves, full-face respirator, half-face respirator, whatever you can find for safety sake, wear it.

Nowhere on Mr. Guard's label, the lawn and garden guy, nowhere.

They could have Monsanto gloves. That would have been nice to just include with a bottle of Roundup, wouldn't it?

Here's the irony of all ironies. Monsanto gives the most stringent warnings to the most sophisticated users. Because there are warnings here they give to farmers that were in the Agricultural Health Study. They're all told to wear PPE, told to wear gloves whenever you mix it. If you get it on your clothes, throw them away. Discard them is the word they use.

That's what they say to farmers. Farmers are pretty sophisticated people when it comes to applying herbicides and pesticides. That's what they do for a living a lot of time. Especially if they grow the Monsanto genetically modified seeds.

2.1

So they give the most stringent warnings to the most sophisticated users, but the least sophisticated users like John Durnell get the least stringent warnings. I've never heard of such a thing in my life.

Usually every human being gets treated the same when it comes to warnings of a dangerous product. It doesn't matter where you work, who you are, what your race is, how old you are. None of that matters. You get the same warning.

Mr. Guard, I had to call him as a witness.

You'll see a picture in their slide show. He's got
a happy face. This is what he looked like when he
was in the courtroom. He had glasses on. Do you
remember that?

He wants you to believe that EPA controlled the labeling, but then I had to take -- I had to take a highlighter, had to give it to him, and he highlighted almost all the label that he said EPA required saying that the highlighting is what Monsanto put on there. It wasn't required by the EPA. Then I had to give him a document that Stephen Wratten wrote, or I guess written letter, that's P74, that said the proportion of label statements that are mandatory and based on

regulatory requirements is small, perhaps 5 percent or less of the label text.

2.1

Good grief. Less than 5 percent, now you're in Tomasetti's range.

He got up here on the stand and said, "We have to do what the" -- remember that? I asked him. I knew what he was going to say. I've taken his deposition. I had him in court before. And I had to go through that long time with him with the highlighter and show him that letter that he did not want to see.

And the funny thing is this guy, it took me forever to get him to admit that Roundup lawn and garden products are only sold in a handful of countries in the world. He wanted to try to confuse you with agricultural products. I had to do all kind of gymnastics with him to get him back to what he said under oath previously.

And he has told you that in Canada and the U.S., new Zealand and Australia, 1 percent or less of all Monsanto Roundup sales are the lawn and garden market. 99 percent is something else. Most of it's farming. You looked at Defendant's Exhibit 25 that I went through with Donna Farmer. Do you remember the big map on it?

They wanted you to conflate, confuse, agricultural use with the way John Durnell used Roundup. That was the whole reason for that exercise. And he said it's only 1 percent of the market and we only do it in these few countries.

And then we even found this document. What happens when somebody complains about anything from outside the company? They call it whack-a-mole. I can't even make this up.

He says, "We've been playing a whack-a-mole for years and calling it just that and joking about it yesterday." That's Plaintiff's Exhibit 228.

John Azevedo. What did he say? It was a short video, if you remember. He said, "I was told I could drink this stuff." He said they were trying to get the warning to less of a warning like caution. He said he got no safety training for his job. He said, "We're all about making money, so get it straight." That's what he learned from Brett Begemann.

If any company in America woke up one morning, asbestos company, pesticide company, baby powder company, drug company that made a drug that caused problems, if any of those companies woke up one morning and they had evidence that said, look, our

products are causing cancer, even if there's a chance, if there's just a teeny-weeny, even if it's a Tomasetti chance, we ought to do something about it. We ought to at least tell people that that is going on. I would say almost every company in America, with the exception of just a few, would do that.

One would be the asbestos industry. They knew what would happen there. People found out asbestos caused cancer, the product comes off the market. That's what happened. It took decades to get that evidence out there. And we've seen that with other products. Johnson's Baby Powder. Decades.

We've seen it with pharmaceutical drugs like fen-phen. We've seen it with diabetic drugs like Rezulin and Actos. That's what responsible companies do. Once something happens they get it off or they put a black box warning there, saying this stuff can cause cancer. It's poison. Be careful about it. Talk to your doctor before you take it, before you use it.

Now, John Durnell -- I'm trying to save a little bit of time for after Mr. Brown goes.

John Durnell. These are his claims in this case. He would like a cancer-free life. Can't

have that anymore. He's in remission. It might come back. You heard what Dr. Hu said.

2.1

By the way, why didn't they go Dr. Hu? He's right next door to him.

Physical pain. Mental suffering. Loss of enjoyment of life. Physical impairment. Grief. Anxiety. Emotional distress. You heard the man testify. You know that's real. He tried to keep from breaking down on the stand. He didn't try to do it for drama. It's what his own body and mind and soul was telling him when he was you there on the witness stand. And you heard Richard Eaton describe what he's gone through.

I don't even know what it would be like if I had to wear a port right here because my veins were so messed up they couldn't stick me with a needle to draw blood on my appointment every six months or a year, if I had to wear a port right there.

I couldn't imagine what he goes through every day. I couldn't imagine waking up and thinking, hey, I feel anything? Has anything popped up?

Yeah, did I just pull my groin or is that another lump there?

I mean, every cancer victim who's in remission goes through that mentally. I don't know why the

defense has to belittle that. That's what cancer victims go through.

2.1

And, by the way, I didn't see one ounce of sympathy from Monsanto's lawyers when they were cross-examining John Durnell or Richard Eaton. I saw the opposite. I don't know what y'all saw, but it wasn't sympathy.

So if there's any fake emotion going on, it's not coming from John Durnell.

Dr. Spaeth told you what his hours of spraying were. There were hundreds of days, hundreds of hours.

That's what Kirk Azevedo said that that man right there told him: We're here to make money, so get it straight.

You know, I've got this up there. I'm a suffering Predators fan, as you all know, but we've come to the part of case where I have to tell you what a man's life is worth. And I can tell you that's the hardest thing to do ever for me. Ever in any jury trial. And I always have a conversation with my client. My dear client here, Mr. John Durnell.

And I had a conversation with him, and I said, "John, I got to ask that jury to bring back a

verdict tomorrow for you."

And he said, "What do you mean, Roe?"

I said, "We've got to put a dollar amount on what you've gone through. I have to be fair to the defense lawyers and I have to put a number on that and not just leave it out there, try to give the jury some roadmap, some way to think of this."

He said, "Look, Roe, I don't want to be greedy about this."

I said, "I know that, John. I know that. The jury knows that. Don't worry about that. But I have to give them a number. I have to give them a number to compensate you."

So a lot of times I talk to juries about, you know, paintings, a valuable painting, if you see a valuable painting like a van go or a Money or an Andy Warhol or a because quite, anything like that and there's a fire and the fireman is going to save the child and let the painting burn. No matter what it's worth.

Pilots are taught, our Air Force and Navy pilots are taught, if you're flying those billion dollar planes and something happens and something is going wrong with the plane, even weather, hit the eject button and get out of it. Let the

billion dollar plane crash.

2.1

So we do value human lives in a different way.

And john said, "Well, I'm a Blues fan, and the most important thing for me was when the Blues won the Stanley Cup."

I said, well, that's kind of cool. And I thought well, how can I tell the jury? I said, that's a valuable trophy. Now, it can be replaced, but if it was in a boat and it was sinking because it hit an iceberg, would the Coast Guard save the Stanley Cup or would they save the person on board? They would always save the person on board.

So how do you value that? So I said, look, Jim Guard said that Monsanto's ad budget for lawn and garden products only is 15 to \$18 million a year. That's what he testified to.

I said that's a lot of money, but that's not what they spend on -- their ad budget every year, every year. You've seen the stipulation where the company's worth over \$7 billion at the time of the Bayer acquisition. You've seen that. You've seen what his medical bills are.

And if you were to award him somewhere between 15 and \$18 million, maybe they wouldn't run ads for a year for lawn and garden use. I would hope not.

Maybe they get the message.

2.1

But the amount of money is in your sound discretion, and John is willing to commit it to your sound discretion. He told me, "Do not tell them that's what they have to do."

So I'm saying you don't have to do that. You can actually give him more. You could give him less. It's your discretion what is reasonable fair compensation for what he's gone through.

Then there are punitive damages. We believe the evidence shows that Monsanto acted in a manner to justify an award of punitive damages, and the judge has instructed you on what's the law you have to follow on that. And it's a different standard than compensatory. It's clear and convincing evidence. Is there clear and convincing evidence that Monsanto did what it did?

I think the answer is yes.

And if you're a fair jury and you decide to award punitive damages, you just take a multiple.

In the Code of Hammurabi, going back like thousands of years, if you killed somebody's ox on a Wednesday, you had to give them seven ox in return. Not just one ox back. You have to do seven if you did it on purpose. If you did something that was

grossly negligent.

2.1

So let that kind of guide your conscience.

Don't give anything over ten, pleases. So whatever you give in compensatory, let's say it's a dollar, don't exceed \$10 in punitive damages.

But I'm confident. I've watched you all for three weeks now. Only nine of twelve of you have to come to a verdict. It don't have to be unanimous. I think we've proven it. I think we're going to get a unanimous verdict.

You've been following the judge's instruction not to form any conclusions or talk to anybody else about the case. But I believe that you are with John Durnell. I believe that the proof shows that John Durnell and his non-Hodgkin's lymphoma due to use of formulated Roundup was a cause or contributed to cause to his cancer, and I believe that's by a preponderance of the evidence.

And in -- what happened to my screen?

Don't forget Donna: We can't say it doesn't cause cancer. Don't forget this document from -- by a guy at the EPA: If I kill this, I should get a medal, referencing glyphosate IARC question. And don't forget to ring the bell for John Durnell.

Thank you, your Honor. Thank you, ladies and

gentlemen.